October 04, 2026

OEF 25 Part 1

The 9/11 attacks shook America to its core. Someone was responsible, and they would have to pay. The only questions were who and how. Who was surprisingly easy to figure out. A check of the passenger manifests revealed that several were known members of Al Qaeda, and intercepted communications between members of the group talked about a successful operation. But that made how extremely difficult.1 Since Sudan had kicked him out under diplomatic pressure back in 1996, Osama bin Laden and most of his network had been based in Afghanistan, a country that was going to be as difficult to access for the US military as almost anywhere on the planet. Direct access from the sea was impossible, and the shortest route from US bases in the region ran through Iran, which was unlikely in the extreme to grant overflight rights. Coming in from the south would mean overflying Pakistan, the major sponsor of the Taliban, while access from the north meant going through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, all former Soviet republics that the US wasn't particularly close to.

The last time the US had gone after bin Laden, in retaliation for the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, it had used Tomahawk cruise missiles, flying through Pakistani airspace. But cruise missiles alone were clearly an inadequate response if the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden, and a plan was put together under the codename Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).2 Fortunately for the US, there was an active civil war in Afghanistan, with the so-called "Northern Alliance"3 still holding onto a significant corner of the country. Both sides were poorly equipped, but with US air support, coordinated by CIA and special forces teams, there was a good chance the Northern Alliance could rout the Taliban with minimal American presence on the ground.

But that was a very different thing from "minimal American presence", and planners and diplomats quickly set to work assembling the basing and overflight rights necessary to support this campaign, as well as the units required to execute it. The most important problem was Pakistan. The bulk of any US air effort would clearly come in from the south, either from carriers operating in the Arabian Sea or bombers flying out of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and that would mean transiting Pakistani airspace. But while Pakistan had been an American ally during the Cold War, most prominently when America was providing support to the mujahideen fighting against the Soviets, relations had grown frosty in recent years, particularly after Pakistan first tested a nuclear weapon in 1998 and a military coup a year later. Making matters worse, Pakistan had been the Taliban's major sponsor, seeing it as a way of ending the anarchy that had gripped Afghanistan,4 and public opinion in Pakistan was fairly hostile to the United States. The Bush administration gave Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf a clear choice: either support the US in its new "War on Terror" and be rewarded with sanctions relief and increased aid, or be added to the enemies list. Despite all of the problems, Musharraf officially chose to side with the US, and American airpower had its route into Afghanistan.5


Bush and Musharraf

Pakistani support alone wouldn't be enough to enable the campaign that Central Command (CENTCOM)6 wanted to fight. Sending American aircraft over Afghanistan without CSAR7 support was risky, and while units based in Pakistan, Oman or on aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea could provide cover in the southern portion of the country, the operations in the north would need support from CSAR units based somewhere in one of the former Soviet republics. And because all of the organized opposition was in the north, an air campaign limited to the south wouldn't be all that effective relative to one where the US could embed CIA and special forces teams with the Northern Alliance and provide air support for troops on the ground. Tajikistan was quick to offer a base, but getting into Afghanistan from there would involve navigating high and treacherous mountains, while the Uzbek-Afghan border was relatively flat.


A CSAR MH-53J is offloaded during OEF

But even though Uzbekistan had hosted a secret CIA Predator base for several years, the government was being difficult, holding out for increased US aid, including against its own homegrown Islamist movement. Some of this might have been because it was not on good terms with Russia, whose new President, an obscure former KGB officer named Vladimir Putin, had offered Russia's full support to the war on terror.8 Uzbekistan finally agreed to allow CSAR to be based in its territory on October 1st, although getting the unit ready in time for the anticipated kickoff on the 7th would be difficult, given the primitive facilities and the need to send in 67 C-17 flights to set up the CSAR team there.


Carl Vinson replenishes during Enduring Freedom

The logistics situation was slightly better in the south. The Enterprise group had been just about to head home when the attacks happened, while Vinson was on her way to take over in CENTCOM, and both carriers were ordered to stay on station in the Arabian Sea. The Roosevelt group had been preparing to deploy, and was ordered to join them from Norfolk, while Kitty Hawk, stationed in Japan, was ordered to CENTCOM sans air wing, to be used as a "lily pad" for special forces operating in southern Afghanistan. But they'd need a base further forward for good CSAR coverage, and a place to divert if any of the aircraft had serious problems. Musharraf agreed to allow the Americans to use an airfield near Jacobabad, halfway between the coast and Kandahar. Security there would be provided by a detachment of Marines from the 15th MEU(SOC),9 aboard the Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group, which had rushed to the area from Australia.


A Hornet refuels over Afghanistan

If the Navy was going to contribute to the air campaign, it was also going to need quite a bit of help from the Air Force. Much of the fleet's striking power was provided by short-legged Hornets, which were going to struggle to get past 250 nm on internal fuel, so multiple aerial refuelings would be required to reach targets in Afghanistan, which were at least twice that far away. To maintain safety margins, at least two refuelings were needed each direction, requiring an elaborate plan to make sure nobody had to land in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Some of the fuel could be provided by S-3 Vikings off the carriers, but the bulk would need to come from land-based tankers, flying either from Diego Garcia or the various nations on the shores of the Arabian Gulf. The US had an extensive network of bases there, heavily used in the campaign against Saddam, although the Saudis, concerned about domestic reaction to Americans bombing a Muslim country from their territory,10 came close to refusing to allow CENTCOM to use the new air operations center that had opened at Prince Sultan Air Base just months before. The other Gulf States were more cooperative, and Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman all played host to tankers and other support aircraft.


An RAF Tristar passes fuel to Hornets

And it was here that international support for the US showed itself beyond simply basing and overflight rights. There was no way the British could stay out of such an insane aerial refueling plan, and RAF VC10s and Tristars served alongside KC-135s and KC-10s, providing about 20% of all tanking for the Navy's effort. The RAF also contributed Nimrods and Canberras to gather information for targeting purposes, while Australia sent fighters to defend the base at Diego Garcia, home not only to tankers but also to B-52 and B-1 bombers, the Air Force's way of making sure it didn't feel left out from the fun.


Bombs are readied aboard Vinson

Things began to kick off in late September, when the CIA started infiltrating members of the secretive Special Activities Division into the country to meet up with the Northern Alliance and prepare for the arrival of uniformed special forces units, which would first arrive in mid-October. Before they could get there, the air campaign began, with the first bombs falling on October 7th. The initial targets were what passed for the Taliban's air defenses, mostly systems inherited from the Soviet-backed government that had fallen in 1992. About 100 MiG-21 and Su-22 fighters were in the country, although only half were even vaguely operational, and there weren't enough pilots even for those. The same could be said of radar and SAM systems, with only a few SA-3s near Kabul and Kandahar that could pose any threat to US aircraft at medium or high altitude. Lower down, AA guns and shoulder-fired SAMs were more dangerous, but easy enough to avoid. Still, there was no point taking chances, and the highest-risk targets would be dealt with by a pair of B-2s flying direct from Missouri carrying 32 JDAMs between them, with numerous aerial refuelings during their 44-hour mission. Other targets, including tank concentrations and Al Qaeda training camps, were hit by 5 B-1s and 10 B-52s from Diego Garcia, as well as 25 fighters from the carriers. All told, the attacks on the first night, which also included 50 TLAMs from destroyers and submarines (including the British SSNs Triumph and Trafalgar), went after 31 targets with 275 individual aimpoints, destroying about 85% of them.


John Paul Jones launches a Tomahawk into Afghanistan

But taking out the Taliban's air defenses, and even some strategic targets, would not be enough to topple their government. That would take American soldiers on the ground to provide air support for the Northern Alliance, and ultimately a wholesale occupation of the country, a topic we will turn to next time.


1 I'm going to ignore the diplomatic, intelligence and financial efforts made to fight terrorism in favor of studying the military campaign. This isn't to underrate the importance of these, particularly the financial aspects. ⇑

2 The original codename had been "Infinite Justice", but this was changed when it was pointed out that many Muslims think that only Allah can deliver infinite justice. ⇑

3 Afghanistan is split between different ethnic groups, and the Pakistan-backed Taliban was largely Pashtun, who made up about 40% of the population, while the Northern Alliance was largely Tajik and Uzbek, and received a lot of support from Iran. ⇑

4 And of getting rid of the Afghan refugees that had flooded over the border starting with the Soviet invasion. ⇑

5 Unofficially, I trust we all remember where they finally found bin Laden. ⇑

6 The US combatant command responsible for the Middle East and Central Asia. ⇑

7 Combat Search and Rescue ⇑

8 This wasn't out of the goodness of his heart. He was still something of an international pariah thanks to Russia's brutal suppression of a revolt in Chechnya, and, fortunately for him, there were significant ties between the Chechen rebels and Al Qaeda. ⇑

9 A reinforced Marine battalion, with its own aircraft and logistics. ⇑

10 The presence of American forces in the home of Islam's holy sites was one of bin Laden's cited grievances, after all. ⇑

Comments

  1. October 04, 2026ike said...

    It is a real shame the USN was unable to send a CBG to the Caspian, through the Russian canal network.

    Thanks and respect to you for going through all this, bean.

    It can't have been fun to catalog all the treasure, blood, and lives spent for decades on inevitable failure.

  2. October 04, 2026bean said...

    I'm not planning to go deep into the occupation. I'm just interested in the question of how the US waged war in a country so far from its bases.

    As for a CVBG in the Caspian, well, I suppose we could go ask Shield about that, but I think even the smallest fixed-wing carrier the US ever had is probably over Caspianmax.

    (I'm also not sure failure was inevitable, but that's way outside my scope here. I'm just interested in logistics.)

  3. October 09, 2026bean said...

    For the record, I checked, and the maximum depth into the Caspian is like 4m, which isn't enough for almost any warship.

  4. October 19, 2026Basil Marte said...

    @bean: to the extent your disagreement with "failure was inevitable" is not just a matter of having a different goal definition, it would be interesting on its own, perhaps as correcting the common misconception. As in, e.g. my understanding of the American/Coalition goals and strategy is:

    1) Find and kill AQ leadership; topple the Taliban government.
    Whose job: largely special/secret squirrels, supported by more conventional elements as documented above.
    Justification: simply can't let them get away with it, as per standard theory (and human emotion).

    2) Turn Afghanistan into a place more like, let's say, India.
    Whose job: mostly things like NGOs; army engineers e.g. build roads and school buildings for the former to staff. Rest of army sets conditions; in particular, it provides security until the new local regime can take over police and military functions.
    Justification A: cut off the recruiting pool for this sort of organization by making all the wretchedly poor locals less poor.
    Justification B: we put a man on the Moon, how hard can this be?
    Justification C: surely they (the foreign locals) want to be just like us, and are trying to, and the reasons they fail are that they lack some material things (i.e. are poor), and lack know-how (i.e. are ignorant, partly because the Bad Guys feed them bunkum). But as soon as we give them the tools and explain how to do it, surely they will enthusiastically do that. (To invert a quote from ACOUP: surely they don't believe their religion, or value their culture.)

    Goal 1) approximately succeeded.
    Goal 2) clearly failed, because the facts on the ground turned out to be such that it was impossible, no matter how much e.g. domestic support would have been available to the Coalition governments. ("Coercing them to be free our way" is rather too self-contradictory.) One of the symptoms of this was that the Host Nation government couldn't stand up security and so Coalition forces had to keep doing the job.

  5. October 19, 2026bean said...

    My basic take is that goal 2 was more or less in reach by the end, except that we insisted on throwing it away. Turning all of Afghanistan into somewhere nice and stable was probably impossible, at least in the timeframe we have. But keeping the major cities and the surrounding countryside that way, with a bit of US support, was very possible. The US suffered no combat deaths in Afghanistan between February of 2020 and August 2021. Change the name on the mission and keep providing air support, and there's no reason we couldn't have kept it that way indefinitely. Eventually, the Taliban is likely to lose support as it becomes clear they can't win. But that might take another decade.

  6. October 20, 2026John Schilling said...

    Also, note that South Korea did not become a truly democratic nation until 1987. Nation-building takes a generation, because roughly speaking you need to wait until at least the mid-tier civil servants and military officers are people who spent their childhoods learning in the schools you set up.

    This is often overlooked because we inappropriately look to Germany and Japan as examples, both of which had been modern industrial nations with an elected legislature a decade earlier and only needed some material infrastructure rebuilt and a new constitution written. That's a much easier job than the sort of cultural engineering needed in a place like Korea or Iraq or Afghanistan (or I suspect Venezuela).

    Traditionally, this sort of nation-building has been done within the context of a colonial empire. You can do it with only an informal empire of the sort Uncle Sam has long been accused of running, but you can't do it in five or ten years and doing it in twenty years would require doing absolutely everything right.

    It's still worth doing, if you're willing to spend thirty or so years on the job. And as bean notes, the marginal cost of those years was quite low towards the end. But doing the first twenty years of a thirty-year project, including all the bloody expensive parts at the start, and then calling it quits because it's "impossible", seems extraordinarily wasteful and foolish.

  7. October 20, 2026Anonymous said...

    Venezuela has a history of democracy, not an ideal one but neither was Germany's or Japan's at the end of WWII.

  8. October 22, 2026Basil Marte said...

    On the one hand, I didn't intend to imply folly in trying something that turned out to be impossible. Foreign policy is usually not described with VC-ese "make a big bet" language (as there are excellent reasons for it to be predictable), and I phrased justifications B and C to reflect an arrogant overestimation of the chances of success, but despite that, I wouldn't say it was stupid to try.

    On the other hand, the superficial view lists: - Germany and Japan: worked. E.g West Germans strongly wanted to avoid falling under the rule of the East German government. - Korea: it had a competent local government with a police and a military, it only needed some help to tip the civil war in its favor, and then some more to prevent Chinese and Russian help to the other side from crushing it. Local society wanted to win. - Vietnam: similar approach, didn't work. Many locals wanted to win, but too many wanted to lose (or were indifferent). - Iran, right next door in geography: they revolted against a pro-Western government and created a theocracy. - Arab spring, e.g. in Egypt, coincident in time: already "organically" developed to the middle-income status that was roughly the goal state of the nation-building effort, but after some wavering, ended up not having a Western-style social arrangement. Despite taking decades to develop, educate, etc., the Western way still wasn't popular enough. - (checks notes) Oh by the way, even in the states of the Coalition itself, public support for the "Western" social model is disappointingly lukewarm. I don't want to make this about very-current politics, so instead I'll make it about last decade's politics (they are more relevant to the decision to discontinue the intervention in Afghanistan anyway). Brexit, Yellowjackets in France, Fidesz (self-described pursuers of "illiberal democracy") in Hungary, etc. If even in the richest, most developed countries people waver on these things, and without any coercion, freely and openly vote some away (or try to and come close), why would we expect a lifted-to-middle-income Afghanistan to outdo us and more solidly support our ideology than we do?

    I understand the Coalition didn't want to do a USSR, no matter how cheap. Even if occupying Afghanistan indefinitely were free, as to the USSR having the Red Army for other reasons created the free byproduct of keeping the Warsaw Pact governments in place and in line (though they did rather more of the lifting, with their own armies and police), spending e.g. forty-odd years developing Afghanistan despite the locals disliking the occupation, with the eventual result that at some time when the Coalition's thumb temporarily slips, the country turns and as fast as it can lunges into the embrace of presumably Iran to protect them from a possible resurgence, is simply not a goal the Coalition wanted to pursue, even if that were feasible and didn't have even non-monetary costs (such as warping militaries around doing COIN). The part where in retrospect the locals are going to endorse the occupation, as with Germany, Japan, and Korea, was a (the?) key consideration as to the desirability of continuing with it.

  9. October 22, 2026Anonymous said...

    Basil Marte:

    Korea: it had a competent local government with a police and a military, it only needed some help to tip the civil war in its favor, and then some more to prevent Chinese and Russian help to the other side from crushing it. Local society wanted to win.

    Worth noting that the Koreas started with North Korea more developed than South Korea, still of the PoWs who didn't want to return to the Korea they came from most from were the North.

    Basil Marte:

    Vietnam: similar approach, didn't work. Many locals wanted to win, but too many wanted to lose (or were indifferent).

    Most of those who wanted to lose enough to actually fight for it died in the response to the Tet offensive.

    Basil Marte:

    Iran, right next door in geography: they revolted against a pro-Western government and created a theocracy.

    Which they now regret but can't seem to do anything about.

    Basil Marte:

    Arab spring, e.g. in Egypt, coincident in time: already "organically" developed to the middle-income status that was roughly the goal state of the nation-building effort, but after some wavering, ended up not having a Western-style social arrangement. Despite taking decades to develop, educate, etc., the Western way still wasn't popular enough.

    The second round of the election came down to a guy who was involved in the previous regime and a religious nutter because the three reasonable people had split the vote in the first round between them, the true preferences of the people would have been for one of the candidates that didn't make it to the second round to have become president.

    Basil Marte:

    why would we expect a lifted-to-middle-income Afghanistan to outdo us and more solidly support our ideology than we do?

    They've seen first hand exactly what the alternative to our ideology is much better than someone who has lived their whole life under liberal democracy.

    Basil Marte:

    The part where in retrospect the locals are going to endorse the occupation, as with Germany, Japan, and Korea, was a (the?) key consideration as to the desirability of continuing with it.

    But most of the locals in Vietnam, Somalia and Afghanistan probably did want the US to stay.

    The hardest part of COIN in foreign countries isn't the fighting but convincing your own population to allow you to continue doing it but the US managed nearly 20 years so they do seem to be learning.

  10. October 23, 2026bean said...

    Vietnam: similar approach, didn’t work. Many locals wanted to win, but too many wanted to lose (or were indifferent).

    The problem is that this is not remotely what happened in Vietnam. The VC were a fairly serious problem, but largely because they were getting a lot of backing from a nearby state. But they were effectively destroyed at Tet, and after that, basically all of the fighting was done by the NVA. The final collapse of South Vietnam was to an entirely conventional invasion, not to any kind of insurgency. Vietnam is very much in the "they needed our help to not lose the civil war", only we were tired and didn't give it to them.

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