So here we have another chapter that mixes the Mediterranean with the Atlantic, as the Allies go ashore in Italy, beginning with the landings at Salerno. Salerno, south of Naples, is plausibly the most undercovered of the war's amphibious operations relative to how hot it was as a battle. The traditional story of amphibious warfare in Europe is about 90% Normandy and the remaining 10% gets sliced up among, prominently, Torch and Anzio, with Sicily probably also coming in ahead of Salerno. But it was the first large-scale deployment of guided bombs, as well as being the American landing that came closest to disaster of any in the war.

Of course, disaster is not the same thing as failure, which brings us to Anzio. Morison prefers not to dwell on it, but I think it's worth quoting cartoonist Bill Mauldin's excellent book Up Front to give a sense of what it was like there: "Anzio was unique. It was the only place in Europe which held an entire corps of infantry, a British division, all kinds of artillery and special units, and maintained an immense supply and administration setup without a rear echelon. As a matter of fact, there wasn’t any rear; there was no place in the entire beachhead where enemy shells couldn’t seek you out.

Sometimes it was worse at the front; sometimes worse at the harbor. Quartermasters buried their dead and amphibious duck drivers went down with their craft. Infantrymen, dug into the Mussolini Canal, had the canal pushed in on top of them by armor-piercing shells, and Jerry bombers circled as they directed glider bombs into LSTs and Liberty ships. Wounded men got oak leaf clusters on their Purple Hearts when shell fragments riddled them as they lay on hospital beds. Nurses died. Planes crash-landed on the single air strip...

This wasn’t a beachhead that was secured and enlarged until it eventually became a port for supplies coming in to supplement those being expended as the troops pushed inland. Everything was expended right here. It was a constant hellish nightmare, because when you weren’t getting something you were expecting something, and it lasted for five months."

I do like that he gives a nod to smaller operations like Sardinia, Corsica and Elba, which are even more overlooked than Salerno, but I'm not sure I agree with his praise of PT boats. As noted earlier, they were quite popular due to who was occupying the White House.

One thing I must note before closing this section is that Morison's parenthetical about monitors is wrong. The American monitor was a result of the specialized conditions of the Civil War, which put a premium on building quickly and didn't care too much about seagoing performance. Yes, there was some focus on coastal attack, but before the "New Navy" era, they were the backbone of the US fleet. The British monitor was a pure coastal-attack vessel, built starting in WWI and often making use of surplus turrets to deliver heavy firepower ashore. The US never built any of this type, probably because their poor seagoing performance meant you needed bases close to the area you were operating in, and those were short on the ground in the Pacific.

Then there's a somewhat lurching shift back to the Atlantic, where we once again pick up the story of the battle against the U-boats. And once again run straight into the fact that Ultra wasn't declassified. The CVE hunter groups were heavily dependent on Ultra to help find targets, and the campaign against the "Milch Cow" tankers in particular (which had to rendezvous with the boats they were to refuel, a procedure coordinated by radio) was so successful and so dependent on codebreaking that it's a minor miracle the Germans didn't realize what was going on. And, because it's "new weapons week", we also get our first glimpse at the ASW homing torpedo. And there's one of my favorite stories from the Atlantic, that of Borie's battle with U-405, which I've never written up for some reason. I did recently get a book on the encounter, so maybe that will change...

Beyond that, it's a good account of the period when the Allies were clearly on the ascendant in the Atlantic, but still faced a number of challenges as Donitz, one of the best German commanders of the war, hunted for weakness wherever it could be found. The war at this point was truly worldwide, and while Morison's narrowing of the scope in Two Ocean War means this usually doesn't show up, it did here, and I'm glad of it. There's also some mention of the fascinating supply route between Germany and Japan, which involved sending a ship or submarine loaded with whatever strategic materials were in relatively good supply, along with occasional prototypes and blueprints of your latest wonder weapon for the other power to copy. It didn't move material amount of stuff, but it was how we got stuff like Japan's attempt at a jet fighter.

Starting in the 1840s, the electric telegraph began to link together the world's cities. Initially, this was only over land or bridgeable rivers, but soon, efforts were made to pass cables underwater, at least over short distances. Intercontinental cables remained a dream until the arrival of Cyrus Field, an American who put together a company to bridge the North Atlantic. His first attempt, laid by American and British warships in 1857, failed when the cable snapped 300 miles out from Ireland, but he raised more money and tried again the next year. That cable was more successful, in that it did provide a telegraph link between the two countries, but it was so noisy that it would take hours to send a message. To make matters worse, construction and operational defects meant that it failed completely in only a month.

Inside a cable tank

The cable's failure provoked widespread skepticism, a matter made worse by the failure of an even more expensive cable through the Red Sea to India, and a commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the problems of submarine cables. The commission, a joint effort of the British government and the Atlantic Telegraph Company whose members included physicist Charles Wheatstone, published a 560 page report that confirmed that the problems with the cable were ones of design and operation, and that the concept itself was not inherently flawed. Unfortunately, it would take many years for Field to raise the money necessary to try again. Pretty much everyone in his own country was distracted for some reason, and the British ended up providing the lion's share of the money for the second attempt. This time, there was no rush to prepare the cable, and samples were made and thoroughly tested, with the final version being over twice as strong and three times as conductive as the first cable. Read more...

This is another chapter that is basically a straight adaptation of one of Morison's books, in this case Volume 8, with which it shares a title. Unfortunately, the first half gets extremely short shrift, which I think is sad. As much as I am not a fan of Douglas MacArthur, Morison's full account of the New Guinea campaign has long convinced me that it is one of the great military accomplishments of WWII, and he simply doesn't use enough space here to do it justice. I also am not sure that Morison's claims about only MacArthur being able to pull it off are true, but I will agree that it is the one unambiguous piece of evidence the case in favor of him being a great general has going for it.

One thing that jumped out was Morison ascribing the inactivity of the Japanese fleet to American air superiority. While that's certainly part of the picture, the increasingly perilous oil situation the Japanese found themselves in was also a major component not only of the ships not moving, but also of the Japanese inability to train replacement pilots, and it's weird that he doesn't even mention that. That section also has another veiled reference to codebreaking in the Pacific Fleet "finding out" where the enemy submarines were and sending hunter-killer groups after them. And of course, this is where England put up an unmatched score of 6 boats in 12 days, despite the efforts of the group commander to spread kills out among the ships of the unit. For kill number 6, she was only allowed in after 3 other DEs had failed, and promptly added to her tally. Read more...

37 years ago today, while conducting gunnery exercises off the coast of Puerto Rico, Turret II exploded aboard Iowa. 47 members of her crew were killed. Every year, a memorial ceremony is held for them, and I was able to attend in 2019 and honor the men who died.

• Tung Thanh Adams - Fire Controlman 3rd class (FC3) Alexandria, VA
• Robert Wallace Backherms - Gunner's Mate 3rd class (GM3) Ravenna, OH
• Dwayne Collier Battle - Electrician's Mate, Fireman Apprentice (EMFA) Rocky Mount, NC
• Walter Scot Blakey - Gunner's Mate 3rd class (GM3) Eaton Rapids, MI
• Pete Edward Bopp - Gunner's Mate 3rd class (GM3) Levittown, NY
• Ramon Jarel Bradshaw - Seaman Recruit (SR) Tampa, FL
• Philip Edward Buch - Lieutenant, Junior Grade (LTjg) Las Cruces, NM
• Eric Ellis Casey - Seaman Apprentice (SA) Mt. Airy, NC
• John Peter Cramer - Gunners Mate 2nd class (GM2) Uniontown, PA
• Milton Francis Devaul Jr. - Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3) Solvay, NY
• Leslie Allen Everhart Jr. - Seaman Apprentice (SA) Cary, NC
• Gary John Fisk - Boatswains Mate 2nd class (BM2) Oneida, NY
• Tyrone Dwayne Foley - Seaman (SN) Bullard, TX
• Robert James Gedeon III - Seaman Apprentice (SA) Lakewood, OH
• Brian Wayne Gendron - Seaman Apprentice (SA) Madera, CA
• John Leonard Goins - Seaman Recruit (SR) Columbus, OH
• David L. Hanson - Electricians Mate 3rd class (EM3) Perkins, SD
• Ernest Edward Hanyecz - Gunners Mate 1st class (GM1) Bordentown, NJ
• Clayton Michael Hartwig - Gunners Mate 2nd class (GM2) Cleveland, OH
• Michael William Helton - Legalman 1st class (LN1) Louisville, KY
• Scott Alan Holt - Seaman Apprentice (SA) Fort Meyers, FL
• Reginald L. Johnson Jr. - Seaman Recruit (SR) Warrensville Heights, OH
• Nathaniel Clifford Jones Jr. - Seaman Apprentice (SA) Buffalo, NY
• Brian Robert Jones - Seaman (SN) Kennesaw, GA
• Michael Shannon Justice - Seaman (SN) Matewan, WV
• Edward J. Kimble - Seaman (SN) Ft. Stockton, TX
• Richard E. Lawrence - Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3) Springfield, OH
• Richard John Lewis - Fire Controlman, Seaman Apprentice (FCSA) Northville, MI
• Jose Luis Martinez Jr. - Seaman Apprentice (SA) Hidalgo, TX
• Todd Christopher McMullen - Boatswains Mate 3rd class (BM3) Manheim, PA
• Todd Edward Miller - Seaman Recruit (SR) Ligonier, PA
• Robert Kenneth Morrison - Legalman 1st class (LN1) Jacksonville, FL
• Otis Levance Moses - Seaman (SN) Bridgeport, CN
• Darin Andrew Ogden - Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3) Shelbyville, IN
• Ricky Ronald Peterson - Seaman (SN) Houston, MN
• Mathew Ray Price - Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3) Burnside, PA
• Harold Earl Romine Jr. - Seaman Recruit (SR) Brandenton, FL
• Geoffrey Scott Schelin - Gunners Mate 3rd class (GMG3) Costa Mesa, CA
• Heath Eugene Stillwagon - Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3) Connellsville, PA
• Todd Thomas Tatham - Seaman Recruit (SR) Wolcott, NY
• Jack Ernest Thompson - Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3) Greeneville, TN
• Stephen J. Welden - Gunners Mate 2nd class (GM2) Yukon, OK
• James Darrell White - Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3) Norwalk, CA
• Rodney Maurice White - Seaman Recruit (SR) Louisville, KY
• Michael Robert Williams - Boatswains Mate 2nd class (BM2) South Shore, KY
• John Rodney Young - Seaman (SN) Rockhill, SC
• Reginald Owen Ziegler - Senior Chief Gunners Mate (GMCS) Port Gibson, NY

They came to the Navy as strangers. Served the Navy as shipmates and friends and left the Navy as brothers in eternity. - George H.W. Bush

This week, we turn from the drive up the Solomons on Rabaul to the origins of the mighty Pacific Fleet that would ultimately take the war to Japan itself. Morison's coverage of the conflict between MacArthur and Nimitz whether the latter would have any real role in the Pacific is mercifully brief, although unfortunately, so is the rest of the chapter. With the exception of the raid on Truk (and the first appearance of Iowa), this is a chapter about amphibious warfare, and for whatever reason, the amphibious operations feel like they've been cut back more than other portions of the 14-volume series. Maybe it's just a matter of space, as operations like Tarawa were extremely complex and I think he's trying to be more focused specifically on the Navy in Two-Ocean War than he is in the full series.

Beyond that, I don't have a ton to say. The Central Pacific generally gets more attention than the southwest Pacific campaign, so I suspect most of you didn't get as much out of this one, and Morison's normal rhetoric only shows up in a few places, making me wonder if this was a chapter that had to be written hastily in the process of getting the book done. But next week, we'll get the last great carrier battle of the war, as well as one of the great and overlooked campaigns of the war. I promise I'll be a lot more verbose then.

Oh, and as a final note, the 8" guns at Tarawa were not from Singapore. They were instead from a batch bought by Japan in 1905 for use during their war with Russia.

By the mid-1850s, the telegraph was well on its way to uniting the world. In the previous decade, it had woven together the cities of the industrial world, and means had even been found to bridge the narrow seas. But the broad oceans remained a daunting challenge, and it would take a man of unusual drive to bridge them and bring Europe and America within seconds of each other.

The man in question was Cyrus Field of Massachusetts, who had made a fortune in the paper business and semi-retired by his mid-30s. While relaxing after a trip across the wilds of South America, he met a man raising money for a telegraph line from New York to Newfoundland, the closest point in North America to Europe. But Field, after studying his globe, thought that this wasn't going nearly far enough, and became obsessed with linking the two countries across the North Atlantic. With the backing of Samuel Morse and Matthew Maury, a Navy Lieutenant who had basically invented oceanography, he set about raising funds for first the completion of the Newfoundland cable, and then the link across the ocean. He was phenomenally successful at this, convincing not only many of the leading businessmen on both sides of the Atlantic to invest, but also getting promises of support from the British government, including a long-term operating subsidy and the use of warships to help lay the cable. The American government was far more reluctant to get involved, due to a mix of provincialism and anglophobia, but the bill squeaked through the Senate, and Field had the support he needed for the project. Read more...

It's time once again for our monthly open thread. Talk about whatever you want, so long as it isn't culture war.

Overhauls are light this week, just the 2025 posts, Suez Parts four, five and six, as well as and Dipole Python.

This looks like another grab-bag chapter, covering much of 1943 in the Pacific. Fortunately, he doesn't spend a ton of time on strategy this time around, going straight into the Komandorskis, an interesting and often-overlooked battle. There's an interesting note to his mention of the superiority of American gunnery. One of the reasons the Japanese made relatively few hits was that their patterns were too tight, turning a salvo that might have made a single hit into a miss. Other than that, we see the same sort of turn-away at the last minute that later happened at Samar. Other than that one action, the Aleutians campaign is most notable as being both extremely unpleasant to serve in and extremely unimportant strategically.

But the majority of the chapter is from Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, the longest volume in the series, and one of the best in the series. (I know I've said that several times, but if I had to pick standout volumes, it would probably be The Battle of the Atlantic, Operations in North African Waters and Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. Possibly not coincidentally, Morison personally observed all three campaigns and the latter two are covering campaigns that have otherwise seen little attention from historians.) I do find it interesting that Morison explicitly mentions codebreaking with regards to Yamamoto's death, as that's not done in the earlier volume, although it's pretty obvious in retrospect. But that's also probably the most famous incident covered in the entire chapter, despite half a dozen quite intense and interesting land and naval battles, to say nothing of Bismarck Sea, the most interesting action involving the B-25 Mitchell. Read more...

This is the conclusion of reader Michael Tint's series cataloging the history of the jet fighter, from the earliest days to the rise of electronics. Now, we'll take a look at the current fifth generation, and the sixth generation that is currently under development.

Gen 5

Development of Gen5 fighters technically began in the late 1980s, but the end of the Cold War meant large delays in development. As a result, the first Gen5 fighter did not enter service until 2005. As with every previous generation, these aircraft are larger, more expensive, and more capable than their predecessors.

There are also far fewer of them. Despite being in development since the 90s, only 3 true Gen5 fighters have been put into service, the F-22, F-35 and J-20. The sheer cost of development deterred a lot of countries from attempting the effort once the Cold War ended. Once countries began to need replacement aircraft, the sheer size of the F-35 program further discouraged competition. Developing the F-35 was a hugely expensive effort, but once developed, unit costs fell rapidly, and the fly away price of an F-35 is comparable with in production Gen4 fighters. Read more...

Today is the kickoff for our next Book Club book, Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War.

Dean is participating, and you should, too

On the whole, I enjoyed this chapter. It's a good look at both some ships that I didn't know much about and at the Japanese procurement environment between the Russo-Japanese War and the start of the treaty era, although the recounting is very dry. More broadly, this is a good illustration of the difference between what you see in a lot of warship books and what Norman Friedman does so well. If I had to describe his secret sauce, it would be working in the details he gives of who is doing what in a way that makes the narrative at least somewhat more approachable than a textbook. Also, he's really good at preemptively answering questions you might have, or at least nodding to them and saying he doesn't know why, either. For instance, why was Tone fitted with two short 8 cm guns in addition to the 15 cm and 12 cm? My first guess would be that they were for firing starshells, but there's no mention of the purpose at all, and a later class has four, which probably rules that out. (This isn't unique to Japanese Cruisers. I've seen other books which missed fairly obvious questions, most irritatingly Dulin & Garzke's book on Bismarck.) But there's at least a lot of detail here, which is really useful should I decide to write on one of these cruisers at some point.

I have mixed feelings on the way the chapter was structured. On one hand, it's nice to see all of the different twists and turns the programs underwent in an era where Japan had an active budget office that didn't always give the Navy what it wanted. On the other, it's not exactly linear, and I kept getting confused early on about which programs were being built or punted down the road. Read more...