The practice of operating aircraft at sea evolved rapidly from the earliest days of naval aviation through the introduction of the true aircraft carrier immediately after WWI, and was refined as more navies got into the game in the 20s. These in turn formed the basis of carrier operations through 1945, although some changes were necessary, largely to deal with the increasing weight of aircraft through the 1930s.

T4Ms (back) and F3Bs on a carrier deck, c.1930

The typical carrier aircraft of 1930 was a biplane, relatively light and with a lots of wing area to generate lift. For instance, an American air wing might be composed of Boeing F2Bs (gross weight 2,805 lb, wing loading 11.5 lbs/ft²), Vought O2Us (gross weight 3,635 lb, wing loading 11.4 lbs/ft²) and Martin T4Ms (gross weight 8,071 lbs, wing loading 12.3 lbs/ft²). But by 1941, the same carrier would be carrying an all-monoplane wing of Grumman F4Fs (gross weight 7,423 lb, wing loading 28.6 lbs/ft²), Douglas SBDs (gross weight 10,855 lb, wing loading 33.4 lbs/ft²) and TBDs (gross weight 10,194 lb, wing loading 24.2 lb/ft²). To an extremely rough approximation, takeoff and landing speeds scale with the square root of wing loading, so the 1941 air group would need to be going 40-70% faster than their predecessors of a decade earlier to take off or land. In practice, this requirement was mitigated somewhat by the switch from biplanes to monoplanes, which are more aerodynamically efficient, and the adoption of high-lift devices like flaps and slats that allowed the aircraft to stall at lower speeds.¹ Despite this, they still would require stronger arresting gear and more room for takeoff, limiting the number of airplanes that could operate from a given ship. Read more...

Inspired by some discussion in the Discord, I'm going to try something new, a book club readthrough of Samuel Eliot Morison's The Two-Ocean War, his single-volume history of the USN in WWII. It's a condensed version of his 14-volume History of US Naval Operations in WWII, an excellent work that is probably a bit too long for most people. Now, because even the "short" version is nearly 600 pages, I'm going to set the schedule of one chapter per week, which should average around 30 pages. I'll put up a discussion post each Wednesday with my thoughts (although I am going to do my best not to do very much research outside of reading the book) and everyone is free to comment. The first post, on Chapter 1, The Twenty Years' Peace, will go up on February 4th, a week from today. If you're interested, you can get the book here (Amazon affiliate link) and we'll see how this goes.

Today, we continue reader Michael Tint's series on the history of the jet fighter, cataloging the changes that came with each generation of aircraft. He previously covered generations 1 and 2, the subsonic and early supersonic aircraft, and later talked about generations 5 and 6, defined by stealth.

Gen 3

An F-4 Phantom, the definitive Gen 3 jet fighter

The 1960s saw the emergence of Gen3 fighters, marking the moment electronics ceased to be accessories and became the heart of the aircraft’s design. As radars became mandatory for tracking and radar guided missiles became the primary means of engagement, the fighter demanded more. More internal volume to house powerful radars and electronics, more hardpoints to carry more and bigger missiles, more thrust to keep up the speed, and more fuel to keep it all going. This is the era when the nimble dogfighter of old was replaced by the complex integrated weapons platform. Read more...

With 2025 behind us, we can look back on the year and figure out who deserves that most prestigious of Naval Gazing awards, the William D Brown Memorial Award for the biggest naval screwup that didn't kill anyone.

Compared to last year, our crop of entries is slightly down, although one navy in particular seems determined to win a third award on the trot:

• USS Harry S Truman ran into a tanker, then dropped one Super Hornet over the side while evading missile attack before losing a second a week later when the arresting wire broke
• USS Nimitz, for losing a Super Hornet and a helicopter on her final cruise
• USS New Orleans, attempting the classic route to Brown glory by setting the ship on fire
• The US Navy, specifically SecNav Phelan and SecDef Hegseth, for their mishandling of the Constellation program

Read more...

It's time once again for our regular Open Thread. Talk about whatever you want, so long as it isn't Culture War.

I've had to close signups for Dayton, as we are at about the maximum number of people I can reasonably handle during the tour. Sorry for those who missed out, and hope to see you somewhere in a future year.

Overhauls are A Spotter's Guide to Warships of the World Wars, Bringing Back the Battleships, New Year's Logs, SYWTBABB Leftovers Part 1, NWAS Cruise Missiles Part 2, the Ticonderoga Class and for 2024-2025, US Military Aircraft Part 5, John Olson's review of Danish Cold War fortifications, The Displacement of a Long-Hull Perry and Abstractions in Defense Analysis.

In the 1960s, as the British Empire came to an end, one of the great challenges faced by London was Rhodesia. It was ruled by white settlers, like several of Britain's African colonies, but uniquely, maneuvering by the colony's founder and namesake, Cecil Rhodes, had left it almost entirely self-governing. This greatly limited Britain's ability to bring Africans into the government, and any attempt to do so would push Rhodesia into declaring independence or possibly joining South Africa, already deep in the grip of apartheid. Negotiations dragged on through the early 60s, but no solution could be reached, and in 1965, Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence, although they completely failed to gain international recognition.

HMS Plymouth intercepts a tanker during the patrol

This left Britain with a problem. Most of the former colonies were now independent and had joined the Commonwealth, which London saw as a useful means of exerting soft power. But such organizations work both ways, and the presence of a white-dominated regime on territory that legally belonged to Britain was something that the former colonies were not prepared to tolerate, and they demanded that Britain do something. Rhodesia was landlocked, and the main connections to the outside world ran through either South Africa, which was increasingly hostile to Britain and friendly to the regime and had promised to be the second country to recognize them, or through Mozambique, still a Portuguese colony that Lisbon was trying desperately to hold on to. That meant direct intervention was out, and the British instead announced comprehensive sanctions, less because they expected them to work, particularly with Portugal and South Africa flatly refusing to cooperate, than because it was the only thing they could do at a reasonable cost. Read more...

Prussian military theorist Carl von Clauzwitz famously said "War is the continuation of policy by other means." In this, he was pointing out the link between conventional diplomacy and warfare, both of which are intended to achieve the state's objectives. What he didn't say is that foreign policy, and even war, is often an extension of domestic politics by other means, too. Stirring up anger against foreigners is a great way to distract from issues at home, and if popular support really is wavering, a "short, victorious war" may even be necessary. Of course, then you're in a war and the enemy gets a vote on when it stops, which rarely turns out well for the people who initiate it.

Probably the purest example of this is the Falklands War, driven almost entirely by the need for a repressive military junta to distract the population from an increasingly bad economic situation. It did not end well for them. This is an unusually clear example of domestic policy/politics driving a war, given the lack of any concrete economic or military benefit from possessing the Falklands, but we have seen the same thing happen repeatedly over the last few centuries. Read more...

This week has seen the announcement by the Trump Administration that they are going to be building "battleships", a subject that is well within my beat, so I figured I would take the time to start by saying that these are nothing of the sort. Defining the battleship is slightly tricky, but the best version I have is that it is a large, gun-armed armored warship. This proposal is certainly large, but it doesn't really classify as gun-armed, in that the guns are clearly secondary weapons, and there's been no discussion of armor at all. So whatever these are, they aren't battleships. Their closest cousin is the Soviet Kirov class, which likewise are somewhat hard to classify, but in the finest tradition of the USN, I'm going to go with "Large Missile Cruiser" for these. But the fact that they're being called by the wrong name, while personally extremely annoying, is just the tip of the iceberg.

First, a look at the announced specs, as given above. The dimensions are somewhat large given the displacement, as they're a pretty close match for Iowa, which is 50%+ heavier at full load, although they're also not too far from the Alaskas, of roughly the same displacement. The length might make sense if they were going for nuclear power, because a very long hull would minimize power requirements, but it seems that it's IEP instead. But then we get to armament, and things get weird. It starts with the new ship-launched nuclear cruise missile that Trump has been pushing since his first term. This is basically a replacement for the nuclear Tomahawk, and whatever the logic for or against such a program might be, there's the problem that I'm pretty sure there's no need to have this new "battleship" to use the missile. Details on the missile are very sketchy, but given that the base program is targeted at submarines, it probably can just go in the VLS with everything else. If it can't that's a requirements problem, and we should change those instead of spending money on this thing. I'm sure the crews will love it, too, given the need to guard the VLS all the time to avoid letting anyone know if there are actually nukes aboard. Read more...

The jet engine represents one of the most significant paradigm shifts in the history of aviation, but the jet age did not spring fully formed from the brow of Frank Whittle. Over the last 80 years, the push and pull of technology and response has seen the emergence of 5 distinct generations of jet fighter, with a 6th currently in development. These generations are more than a simple catalog of models; each represents fundamental shifts in operational capability and design philosophy. Understanding what makes each generation unique and how it came about makes it easier to understand the evolution of air power, the process of technological change, and how the simple interceptor of the 1940s became the complex, networked weapons system of the 21st century.

Gen 1

An Me 262, a bad fighter jet

Gen 0: Meteor, Me 262, P-80, F2H

Gen 1: F-86, MiG-15, Tunnan

Our story begins with the jet fighters that emerged during the Second World War. Of these, the Messerschmitt Me 262 is by far the most famous, but the Gloster Meteor and Lockheed P-80 also saw limited service in the war. These early jets are sometimes referred to as 0th generation fighters to distinguish them from the proper jet designs that emerged a few years later, but they are grouped here because of the short period of time Gen0 would cover and because Gen0 and Gen1 have more in common than not. Read more...

It's time once again for our regular Open Thread. Talk about whatever you want, so long as it isn't Culture War.

A reminder that I am currently taking signups for the 2026 meetup in Dayton, and they're filling up fast. The AirBnB is already full, and at some point soon, I'm going to have to cut things off to keep the size of the tour manageable.

Overhauls are Mine Warfare Part 1, INCW Part 4, Excitement in the Bab-el-Mandeb, and for 2024 US Military Aircraft Parts One, Two, Three and Four.