I've referenced HMS Dreadnought many times, as befits one of the most influential warships of the 20th century. However, I've never told the story of her origin in one place, bringing together the many threads of development that went into her design.

HMS Dreadnought

Dreadnought was in many ways the natural result of improvements in the technology of warships, most notably gunnery and propulsion. Gun ranges were increasing thanks to the work of men like Percy Scott, and the torpedo had become a major threat at close range. This greatly reduced the effectiveness of the 6" QF batteries of the pre-dreadnoughts. Longer ranges limited rate of fire to allow for spotting, and the steeply-falling 6" shells had much smaller danger spaces than the 12". At the same time, improved armor meant that it was now possible to provide adequate protection from the 6" across much of the ship's sides. Read more...

I've been asked several times about classes. A class of ships is a group of ships all built to the same set of blueprints, at least in theory. As with most naval matters, things are more complicated. In some cases, members of a class are essentially identical, while in others, they're totally different.

Iowa, New Jersey and Missouri as completed

As you'd probably expect, we'll start with the Iowas. All four ships were built to fairly similar plans. The biggest structural differences are Iowa's three-level conning tower, intended to house an admiral and his staff in battle,¹ and the heavier armored bulkheads on the ends of the citadel in Wisconsin and Missouri. The most obvious external differences early on were in the bridgework. Iowa commissioned with an open bridge around the front of the conning tower, like the earlier battleships, while New Jersey entered service with a circular enclosed bridge wrapped around the front of the conning tower. Missouri and Wisconsin had a square bridge, which Iowa and New Jersey received during refits.²

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The second half of the second world war saw the greatest amphibious operations the world has ever seen, and probably ever will see. Troops landed on beaches in Europe and across the Pacific, to liberate Hitler's conquests and provide bases for the final defeat of Japan by blockade and bombardment.

Troops wade ashore at Tinian

After Tarawa, the US continued its drive across the Pacific, making several landings in the Marshall Islands to gain fleet bases for the drive to Tokyo. The next step was the landings on Saipan in the Marianas. This was fiercely contested by the Japanese on both land and sea, and the Battle of the Philippine Sea delayed the follow-on landings on Guam for a month. Tinian was invaded by the same forces that had taken Saipan, after the most extensive pre-invasion bombardment in history. Engineers rapidly followed the troops ashore to convert all three islands into giant airfields for the bombardment of Japan.

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Tarawa, one of the Gilbert Islands, was targeted by the US as the first stepping stone in the drive across the central Pacific that had been planned since just after WWI. It marked a new kind of amphibious operation for the Americans, landing on a small atoll into the teeth of Japanese defenses, and far from land-based air support. The assault on Tarawa, and the simultaneous attack on nearby Makin,³ involved approximately 200 ships, 27,600 assault troops, 7,600 garrison troops, 6,000 vehicles and 117,000 tons of cargo.

Bodies on the beach, November 22nd 1943

The troops who landed on Betito Island, the fleck of Tarawa with the all-important airfield, belonged mostly to the 2nd Marine Division, staged out of New Zealand. They were carried to their target by the Southern Attack Force under Rear Admiral Harry W Hill. This force of 16 transports, 3 battleships, 5 cruisers, 5 escort carriers, 21 destroyers, 2 minesweepers, 1 LSD and 3 LSTs began landing operations early on the 20th of November, 1943.

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The military procurement process is famously bad, and it’s easy to come up with stories of the US government overpaying for whatever the item du jour is. I’ll be the first to admit that the DoD has serious issues, and that the system is far from perfect. But the military is also a very demanding customer. For instance, if a piece of software on your computer crashes, the consequences are likely to be fairly minimal. If a piece of military software crashes at the wrong time, people are likely to die. Here’s a tale of one tiny piece of the development of some of that software. Everything included is true, although some details have been obfuscated.

A Large Military Airplane

It was decided that a Large Military Airplane (LMA) needed a moving map. After some analysis, it was decided to develop it from the moving map software already in use on a Small Military Airplane (SMA). Everyone involved thought the software was fairly close to the requirements, and merrily set to work. Read more...

The modern era of amphibious operations is usually identified to have begun with the invasion of Gallipoli during WWI. The Allies were attempting to open a sea route to Russia though the Turkish Straits between the Mediterranean and Black seas. Their initial naval assault had failed badly,⁴ so a plan was made to land troops to silence the guns protecting the strait.

Troops unloading from River Clyde at Gallipoli

Unfortunately, the Allies did almost everything wrong. The plan and equipment had to be improvised in the month between the decision to go ashore and the actual landing in April of 1915. No serious planning had been made for large-scale amphibious operations before the war, and the five divisions assembled,⁵ despite representing some of the best troops available, were insufficient for the job. Like so many invasions before, this one was made in boats rowed ashore. The only specialized landing ship, River Clyde, was a converted collier intentionally grounded near Cape Hellas.⁶ The Ottomans near the beach were insufficient to throw back the landing force, but they inflicted savage casualties due to the lack of fire support and the general chaos. The commanders had not given sufficient emphasis to the need to move inland and the allied advance, like that of the Persians millennia before, bogged down, giving the Turks time to respond. Read more...

Amphibious warfare is the oldest form of naval warfare, dating back to the day when a tribe first crossed a lake to take their enemy by surprise. Since then, the art of moving soldiers across bodies of water into enemy territory has been practiced in a staggering number of variations worldwide. In the late Bronze Age, the Sea Peoples practiced amphibious warfare in the eastern Mediterranean, invading and toppling several civilizations.

Ships beached at Marathon

The first well-attested amphibious operation is the Persian landing at Marathon in 490 BC. Darius of Persia wanted to bring Athens under his control as a base for conquering all of Greece, and dispatched a force across the Aegean to do so. The Athenians managed to prevent the Persians from moving inland from the plain of Marathon, then attacked them five days after they landed, ultimately throwing them back into the sea despite being badly outnumbered.⁷ It's possible that an attempt to reembark part of the army and attack Athens directly was involved. In any case, the Persians learned the first lesson of amphibious warfare: An army must move quickly off the beach, and not allow itself to be bogged down. They would not be the last to pay for this lesson in blood.

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I’ve mentioned Aegis several times, but haven’t really explained what it is. As it, and systems like it, are very important parts of modern naval warfare, this is a gap I intend to rectify.

Aegis destroyer USS Wayne E Meyer at LA Fleet Week 2016⁸

During WWII, navies realized that the increasing performance of airplanes, and the development of guided missiles, would render guns obsolete as air-defense systems. They began to develop missiles as an alternative, although none reached service before the mid-50s. The US 3T family – Talos, Terrier and Tartar – is a good cross-section of these early missiles. These early missiles had much greater envelopes than the guns they replaced, but they weren’t perfect by any stretch of the imagination. Targets were acquired by rotating radars, which would take several seconds to complete a search. Each missile required a dedicated illuminator to provide the signal it homed in on. Due to electronic interference, only two illuminators could be installed on each end of the ship.⁹ Due to the limited accuracy of early missiles, two missiles were fired at each target, limiting a ship to no more than maybe 8 missiles in the air at once. In theory, it should be able to fire about two missiles/launcher/minute, but in practice it was usually limited by guidance channels. Long-range missiles might be able to get off 10 salvos/end, more normal systems about half that. So a heavy escort could kill maybe 20 targets, a normal one 5-10, assuming that the missiles actually worked.

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After the end of the American Civil War, the US quickly went from having one of the world's most powerful navies to one of the least powerful. From 1865 to 1882, Congress left the navy to rot, and the US was soon behind such naval giants as Chile and Brazil. In 1882, an advisory panel recommended the construction of new ships, including battleships in 1885. The resulting ships, Texas and Maine,¹⁰ were second-class battleships of the generation immediately proceeding the Royal Sovereign, with en echelon turrets. Texas had two single 12" guns, while Maine had twin 10" guns. The secondary battery was 6 6" guns, although American industry was not up to producing 6" QF guns at this point, so the guns were not quick-firing. Both had armor protection over only a limited area, and would have been very vulnerable to QF gunfire. They took almost 9 years from contract to completion, and were thus obsolete before they entered service. Because of this delay, and of their origins as second-class ships, they had little influence on later US designs.

USS Maine in Havana Harbor before the explosion

Congress was still being stingy with funding, and in 1889, just before leaving office, Representative John R. Thomas managed to pass an appropriations bill mandating the construction of an "armored cruising monitor" of his own design. This would have been a low-freeboard ship with a twin 10" turret forward, a 6" gun aft, and a 15" dynamite gun¹¹ in the bow. Thomas was a lawyer, not a naval architect, and the new Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Tracy, managed to kill it off before it could turn out to be about the most useless ship ever built for the USN.

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A battleship as built can be seen as the sum of the answers to a whole series of questions, ranging from the highest levels of national strategy down to the most mundane issues of how best to operate a large and complex pile of machinery. A full and comprehensive analysis of all of these questions and their answers for even a single ship would require a whole book (actually several bookcases in danger of structural collapse), but I'll attempt a high-level overview here.

The Austro-Hungarian fleet on maneuvers

The first major question that shapes a ship is "What do we want our fleet to do?" The answer is informed by the strategic situation and the resources available, because there's never enough money as we'd like. We've previously looked at the basics of naval strategy, and the broad choices available to a navy. But how do battleships fit into this framework?

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