Gentlemen,
The recent vindication of Captain Dreyfuss has comprehensively upset the political situation here in France. As a result, the government has been replaced, and you have been asked to serve as the primary advisors in the Ministère de la Marine. Our strategic situation is reasonably strong, but perils loom. It is up to you to guide us.
In early April, 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, a few desolate rocks in the South Atlantic. The British mobilized their fleet in response. The carriers arrived off the Falklands on May 1st, swiftly defeating the Argentine Air Force. The Argentine Navy tried to interfere the next day, but withdrew after the cruiser General Belgrano was sunk by a submarine. Two days later, the Argentines struck back, sinking the frigate Sheffield with an Exocet missile. Two weeks later, on May 21st, British troops landed at San Carlos Water on the west coast of East Falkland. The Argentine Air Force quickly got wind of this, and launched numerous sorties against the invasion fleet. May 21st was brutal for both sides, with the British losing one frigate and having several others damaged, while the Argentinians lost almost a third of the aircraft that actually attacked.1
On the 22nd, the British braced for a repeat of the attacks on the 21st, but bad weather grounded the Argentine aircraft. However, it didn't reach the Falklands, and unloading continued uninterrupted. The 22nd also saw the land-based Rapier batteries finally set up and aligned, adding another layer of defenses to the British positions at San Carlos. The most exciting parts of the day were a pair of incidents where Argentinian 707s, searching for the British, nearly came to grief. The first occurred at 0300 just off the Falklands, when one of the big jets blundered within range of Coventry, waiting to form a missile trap just off Falkland Sound. Unfortunately, the Sea Dart system had a technical fault and refused to fire until after the target had escaped. The second incident was five hours later and 1,800 miles away. A group of escorts, built around the destroyers Bristol and Cardiff and five frigates, had departed the UK on May 10th, and was now well on its way to the Task Force. The group commander picked up the searching 707 and positioned Cardiff to intercept, altering the position of the other ships to conceal his maneuver. The scheme worked, and the Type 42 fired a pair of Sea Darts, which the airliner only narrowly managed to dodge. From that point on, the 707s were much more circumspect when approaching British warships. Read more...
Inky has graciously contributed a review of Israel's premier naval museum.2 Based on his description, I look forward to going some day.
The idea of hiding under the water to strike at a superior enemy is not a new one. Inventors over the centuries have sketched craft that would allow them to approach in secret, then do violence to their opponents. Problems of propulsion, of endurance, and of weaponry thwarted them, and the first serious attempt wasn't made until 1776, when an American named David Bushnell devised the Turtle, a wooden submersible that would be piloted by a single man underneath a British warship, attach an explosive charge, and then run away. When a volunteer, Sgt. Ezra Lee of the Continental Army, attempted to do just that to HMS Eagle on September 6th, he was unable to attach the charge and had to abandon the effort. Turtle was later destroyed to keep her from falling into British hands.
It took another 88 years for a submarine to actually manage to sink an enemy ship. The pressure of the Union blockade during the American Civil War forced the Confederacy to search for asymmetric advantages, and an inventor named Horace Hunley built a submarine that could carry a spar torpedo, a charge on the end of a long boom. A crew of eight drove the propeller through a crank. The submarine, named after Hunley, was not a spectacular success, sinking twice in testing and killing 13 men in the process, including her inventor. Despite these setbacks, the Confederates persevered, and on February 17, 1864, Hunley managed to attack the sloop Housatonic, sinking her and killing five Union sailors. However, the victory proved Pyrrhic, as Hunley was sunk by the same blast.5 Read more...
It's once again time for our regular Open Thread. Talk about anything you want, even if it's not defense-related.
Following on from last OT, it seems there's definite interest in an RTW2 community game. Some reminders: you will be the general staff of whatever nation you pick, making shipbuilding decisions and providing strategic direction. The game plays at one turn/month and theoretically can last 50 years, so I'm going to have to implement a lot of decisions independently. I plan to play 1 year/week, and do a summary post every Monday (this will alternate with the OT, with the OT-week post going into the RTW2 thread from the previous week). I'll give you guys a couple of days to make decisions, probably until Thursday or Friday. I don't plan to restrict who can contribute to decision-making, as the community here is pretty small and congenial, but I might revisit this if there are problems.
So this OT, I'll let you guys decide on what nation you want to play. Options are the US, Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and Austria-Hungary. Some of these will definitely be easier to win wars with than others, but that's up to you. I'm going to say 1900 start and Very Large fleet size, because this should give the easiest ramp in and a big fleet to play with.
Recently overhauled posts include The Falklands War Part 2, Learning From History - The New Maginot Line, So You Want to Build a Modern Navy - Coast Guard Part 1 and all seven parts of the Jutland series:
I've discussed the development of fixed-wing battleship aviation from the earliest days through WWII. But when people learn about the subject for the first time, the biggest question is usually about how it worked. As such, I'm going to look in more detail at the techniques involved.6 I'm going to focus mostly on American practices, and discuss where those of the RN differed.
Battleship seaplanes lacked wheels, so they had to be stored on special trolleys. Each catapult had one, which supported the airplane during both storage and launch. Wheeled dummy trolleys were used when there were more airplanes than catapults or when seaplanes had to be moved around on land. When it came time to launch, the seaplane was secured to the trolley by a set of hooks that would keep it on the catapult during the stroke, then release it at the end. The plane would be checked over, fueled, and the engine started up. Read more...
May 31st, 1916 saw the Battle of Jutland, the greatest clash of battleships in history and the only time the British and German main fleets fought each other. As befits such an interesting and pivotal battle, I've written a long series on it, but for the benefit of those who don't want to wade through all seven parts, I thought it appropriate to write a single-part summary.
In the runup to WWI, the British and the Germans had built huge fleets of battleships, spurred on by the Kaiser's love of shiny toys and the British understanding that the loss of maritime supremacy would be catastrophic. In 1914, the British, who had outbuilt their rivals, instituted a blockade of Germany, plugging up the exits to the North Sea with the Scotland-based Grand Fleet. The Germans, hoping to wear the larger fleet down, attempted to use raids to draw out detached elements and crush them with the High Seas Fleet. By mid-1916, the only result had been a few indecisive battlecruiser engagements, and both sides wanted action. Read more...
One of the great scandals to come out of the Battle of Jutland was the relative ineffectiveness of the British armor-piercing shells. For a variety of reasons, the British had been well behind the other European powers in shell design for at least a decade, and at Jutland, only one of the 17 heavy shells that struck thick German armor penetrated successfully.
But how did Britain, the world's leading maritime power, and an early proponent of most technological advances during this time, end up with ships full of shells that didn't work? The answer is a tangled mix of learning the wrong lessons from war and trials, problems with organizational structure, and the unusual way British procurement took place in the early years of the 20th century. Read more...
World War I had shown the importance of operating aircraft with the battlefleet, and all of the major navies continued to work on this integration in the postwar years. While the aircraft carrier was obviously the best way to take planes to sea, it wasn't seen as completely sufficient, and battleships continued to play host to aviation detachments, although the operating methods changed dramatically.
There were two main problems with the methods used to take aircraft to sea in WWI. First, the flying-off platforms were limited to fairly light airplanes with a low stall speed, and it was obvious that the future of aviation was in heavier planes with higher speeds, including stall speeds. Second, ditching the airplane in the sea after every sortie was obviously impractical in peacetime, and dubious even in a war where the fleet might be operating far from its bases. The obvious solution to the second was the seaplane, an airplane fitted with floats so it could take off from and land on the water.7 This was obviously not a novel idea, but attempts to use seaplanes during the war had been flummoxed by fragility, vulnerability to sea conditions and lack of performance compared to land planes. Improvements in aeronautical engineering had helped mitigate the first two problems, while the third was largely solved by changes in tactical doctrine. With the development of the aircraft carrier, the roles that required high performance could now be filled by carrier-based aircraft not penalized by floats, leaving seaplanes to fill a few specialized niches. The most important of these were scouting and spotting for the battle line. The airplane offered the fleet commander an opportunity to expand his view of the battlefield far beyond the horizon, and placing the scouts on the battleships freed up space on the carriers for fighters and bombers. The ability to deliver a man with a radio to arbitrary points was also seen as a useful way of overcoming the problems posed to fire control by increasing battle ranges. The spotter could call back corrections to the ship's fire, which might also allow ships to engage in conditions where visibility from the surface was poor, due to either weather or manmade smoke. Read more...
This is the last part in "So You Want to Build a Modern Navy". I have a bit more in the archives, but it's probably not worth publishing. The following is based on discussions in Aviation Part 2.
John Schilling: I hadn’t thought about my proposal as a recreation of the Light Fleet Carrier, but given the incredible success of the Light Fleet Carrier program over half a century or so, I’ll own it. I’m proposing the Light Fleet Carrier of the 21st century; how can you possibly refuse something with that winning track record. Read more...
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